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TURNING THE TABLES: USING THE GOVERNMENT’S
SECRECY AND SECURITY ARSENAL FOR THE BENEFIT
OF THE CLIENT IN TERRORISM PROSECUTIONS
SAM A. SCHMIDT AND JOSHUA L. DRATEL*
I. INTRODUCTION
Defending a client charged with terrorism offenses presents
many challenges not confronted in the ordinary case.  Terrorism
prosecutions have created a new legal battlefield with defense coun-
sel positioned precariously in the middle.  Counsel should not be a
pawn for either side, but should provide the most complete, effec-
tive and zealous defense within the bounds of law and the canons of
ethics.
Our involvement as co-counsel for Wadih El-Hage, a defendant
in the Embassy Bombings trial, provided us with first-hand experi-
ence in defending a terrorism case.  At approximately 9:30 a.m. on
August 7, 1998, powerful explosives were detonated simultaneously
in vehicles at the United States’ Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.  The blast in Kenya killed 211 people,
while the bomb in Dar es Salaam killed eleven persons.  Within
months, the United States identified al Qaeda as the culprit and
indicted seventeen defendants, including Osama bin Laden as the
lead defendant.  Six of the defendants were apprehended, and four
ultimately proceeded to trial in January, 2001.  The trial lasted until
July, 2001, and ended in the conviction of all four defendants on all
302 counts.  The jury rejected the death penalty, however, for the
two defendants who had been convicted of capital offenses.1
* Sam A. Schmidt is a criminal defense attorney who was lead defense counsel in
the so-called Embassy Bombing Terrorist case in 2001.  J.D. St. John’s Law School, 1975;
B.A. S.U.N.Y. Stony Brook, 1972.  Joshua L. Dratel is a criminal defense attorney who
currently represents David Hicks, an Australian detained at the U.S. Naval Base in
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.  J.D. Harvard Law School, 1981; B.A. Columbia College, 1978.
He is also President-Elect of the New York State Association of Criminal Defense Law-
yers, and on the Board of Directors of the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers.  The authors would like to thank Monica Lima, Betsy Fiedler, and Arminda
Bepko for their assistance in editing this article.
1. All four defendants who proceeded to trial were sentenced to life without
parole.
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Mr. El-Hage was not charged with involvement in the Embassy
Bombings themselves.  Rather, he was charged with conspiring with
al Qaeda to target through terrorist acts the United States, its na-
tionals, and its interests.  Mr. El-Hage, a United States citizen born
in Lebanon, openly worked for Mr. bin Laden’s business entities in
the Sudan in the early 1990’s.  He lived in Kenya from 1994 to 1997
before returning to the United States with his family eleven months
before the bombings.  In addition to being found guilty after trial
on the conspiracy charges, he was also convicted of twenty counts of
perjury stemming from his two appearances before the grand jury
in 1997 and 1998 (all of which charges were tried in the Embassy
Bombings trial).
Difficulties that exist in conventional cases are aggravated in
terrorism cases.  Both the government and the client place addi-
tional obstacles in counsels’ path.  This Article will explain some of
the lessons we learned about how a defense lawyer can surmount
these additional obstacles and even use them to the advantage of
the client.  We will discuss three specific obstacles in terrorism cases
that make the defense lawyer’s task considerably more difficult:  (1)
the Special Administrative Measures (S.A.M.); (2) the Protective
Orders imposed on discovery produced by the government; and (3)
the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA).  S.A.M.’s govern
the defendant’s conditions of confinement.  The Protective Orders
severely constrain the flow of information available to counsel.
CIPA controls the use and dissemination of “classified” information
relevant to the case.  While each obstacle imposes considerable re-
strictions on the defendant and counsel, they can also aid the
defense.
II. SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES
S.A.M.’s are authorized by the Bureau of Prisons regulations
for the confinement of particularly dangerous detainees.2  S.A.M.’s
impose particularly onerous conditions of confinement.  Their
2. United States v. bin Laden, 109 F. Supp. 2d 211, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), citing 28
C.F.R. § 501.3(a) (1999). See bin Laden, 109 F. Supp. 2d, at 213-15 (describing in gen-
eral some provisions of the S.A.M.’s, and their adverse impact on defendants and the
logistics of defense preparation)  Special Administrative Measures are commonly re-
ferred to in the legal community as S.A.M.’s with an apostrophe.
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harshness eclipses even the conditions for convicted prisoners, in-
cluding those who have committed serious violations of prison
rules.3  The S.A.M.’s did not begin with terrorism cases.  Instead,
they first were used for a convicted Latin Kings leader who had or-
dered murders from prison.4  The S.A.M.’s severely restrict an in-
mate’s ability to communicate with the outside world, and thus
constrain counsel in contacting third parties on the defendant’s be-
half.5  In addition, the defendant is segregated from the rest of the
prison population and is denied many of the privileges ordinarily
available to inmates.  Mail and telephone calls are closely moni-
tored, exercise is limited, and the defendant is held in solitary
confinement.
S.A.M.’s impair counsel’s ability to prepare the defense ade-
quately in several ways.  First, the defendant is focused on alleviat-
ing the onerous conditions rather than on the substance of the
case.  As a result, counsel is forced to develop a defense strategy
without input from the client.  In addition, counsel must spend an
inordinate amount of time attempting to ameliorate the conditions
by negotiating with prison officials, prosecutors, and, if necessary,
the court.  Furthermore, because the defendant is denied access to
outside media, he or she cannot provide guidance and commentary
with respect to potential occurrences that may have a bearing on
the case, or warrant further investigation or exploration.  This limi-
tation is particularly problematic in a terrorism case because pub-
licly reported developments often are relevant in ways counsel
cannot fully understand without assistance from the client.  Given
the international character of the allegations, language issues, and
cultural unfamiliarity, counsel cannot alone grasp the significance
of all relevant witness issues, documents and information.  Educa-
tion and preparation of expert witnesses are hindered by the lack of
access to defendants.  Thus, the most important resource for the
3. The Attorney General’s authority for imposition of the S.A.M.’s is codified at
28 C.F.R. § 501.3(c). See United States v. Felipe, 148 F.3d 101, 110 (2d. Cir. 1998);
United States v. Reid, 214 F. Supp. 2d 84, 86 (D. Mass. 2002).  The S.A.M.’s extend for
one year at a time, and can be renewed indefinitely.
4. Felipe, 148 F.3d at 101.
5. The government’s preoccupation with secrecy is categorical, as is its distrust of
defense counsel, whom it worries will deliberately or inadvertently pass “coded”
messages if permitted to transmit messages from the defendants to third parties.
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defense, the defendant, is effectively unavailable to participate in
the preparation of his defense.
As co-counsel for Mr. El-Hage, we retained Dr. Stuart Grassian,
a Harvard professor and psychiatrist.6  Dr. Grassian examined Mr.
El-Hage and concluded:
Although Mr. El-Hage has not become floridly ill during
his incarceration in solitary at MCC, his psychological
functioning has deteriorated.  His thinking, concentra-
tion and memory are impaired, and he has become in-
creasingly obsessional in his thinking, and
uncharacteristically irritable and volatile.  His relationship
with his wife and with his attorney have both been com-
prised.  His frustration, his feelings or helplessness, and
his inability to have meaningful interaction with his wife
and children, have also played a major role in this
deterioration.7
Moreover, Dr. Grassian’s prognosis for Mr. El-Hage was not
sanguine:
Mr. El-Hage’s psychological status has already seriously
deteriorated, and his capacity to participate in his own de-
fense has already been severely comprised.  Yet his crimi-
nal trial remains at least nine months away, and there is
little reason to expect that these difficulties will remit, ab-
sent a significant amelioration of his conditions of con-
finement; indeed, there is every reason for concern that
the impairment of his attention, thinking, and emotional
control, will only worsen with further confinement under
the harsh conditions he has now experienced continually
for almost one year.8
6. Dr. Grassian is a recognized leader in the field of the effects of solitary con-
finement and sleep deprivation.
7. Dr. Grassian’s November 23, 1999 Report, submitted as part of Mr. El-Hage’s
bail application, on file with authors.
8. Id. Dr. Grassian also found, “for a defendant, such as Mr. El-Hage, who realizes
that he can no longer even count on himself, the oppressive and disabling burden is
even further magnified.” Id. (emphasis in original).  In general, Dr. Grassian is of the
opinion that prolonged solitary confinement “inevitably impairs the defendant’s capac-
ity to participate meaningfully in the preparation of his own defense.” Id.
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We aggressively attacked the S.A.M.’s in the bail application we
submitted on Mr. El-Hage’s behalf.  We knew bail would not be
granted, but we hoped the court could be convinced to ease the
conditions of confinement.  We pointed out that Mr. El-Hage had
spent fifteen months in solitary confinement under the S.A.M.’s
and faced another eighteen to twenty-four months of the same
before trial.  We argued that the conditions impaired his cognitive
and emotional capacity so severely that he could not participate in
this defense.  The court was sensitive to this issue and ordered, for a
period of time, significant modifications in the S.A.M.’s.9  These
modifications included bunking for the defendants, limited exer-
cise time, expansion of available commissary items,10 receipt of
Arabic newspapers, enhanced phone privileges, co-defendant meet-
ings with only one counsel present, and more frequent medical and
dental treatment.
While these changes were not ideal, they represented a vast im-
provement over the prior conditions.  Unfortunately, however, un-
anticipated problems resulted not only in the reversal of all of these
gains, but imposed even more onerous conditions.  In November,
2000, just two months before the commencement of trial, one of
Mr. El-Hage’s co-defendants assaulted a corrections officer and
stabbed him in the eye with a makeshift knife.  The attack occurred
with the alleged complicity of another co-defendant and the alleged
knowledge of yet another.  While Mr. El-Hage was never implicated
in the attack, Bureau of Prisons officials did not make any distinc-
tion between him and his co-defendants.11
9. In its opinion denying severance, the District Court acknowledged the signifi-
cant negative impact of the S.A.M.’s on the defendants and their ability to prepare and
contribute to their defense. See United States v. bin Laden, 109 F. Supp. 2d 211, 213-15
(S.D.N.Y. 2000).
10. This had been restricted beyond that for any other detainees, including those
segregated for disciplinary reasons.
11. The severity of the Bureau of Prisons response to the attack, implemented
without notice or explanation to Mr. El-Hage, was so dramatic that it not only retarded
the progress he had made emotionally and cognitively under the more relaxed condi-
tions, but it made his condition substantially worse than it had been prior to the modifi-
cations of the S.A.M.’s we had accomplished eight months earlier.  The “one size fits
all” application of the S.A.M.’s presents an intractable problem for individual defen-
dants whose own behavior may not be violent, either in prison or even in the context of
the particular charges in the underlying case, but who are lumped together with others
who have committed violent acts either in the context of charged offenses or in prison.
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In this restrictive environment, there is very little counsel can
do to glean positive elements from the S.A.M.’s.  Nevertheless,
counsel’s determination to be a zealous advocate can produce some
positive effects.  Counsel’s willingness to vigorously challenge the
S.A.M.’s in a manner that responds to the client’s concerns and
priorities can build the type of credibility and trust that promotes a
productive attorney-client relationship.  Such actions demonstrate
to the client that the lawyer is not afraid to confront the prison
administration, the prosecutors, and the court.  Further, since suc-
cess in challenging at least some of the S.A.M.’s provisions is likely,
the client will have a basis for confidence in the attorney’s ability to
champion the client’s cause.12
Client confidence often is extremely important in terrorism
cases.  The client is either a naturalized citizen or foreign national
with limited experience in the United States.  The client is likely to
be from a non-democratic regime that does not have an indepen-
dent or fair legal system, and the client may harbor negative
preconceptions about the United States government and justice sys-
tem.  Culture and language differences can foster a lack of empathy
by counsel, making it difficult to achieve consensus on case strategy.
Moreover, the vast majority of defendants in terrorism cases are
represented by court-appointed counsel.  The complexity of the
cases, the volume of discovery, the travel involved in effective inves-
tigation, the need to consult and retain experts, and the length of
the trials make retention of private counsel of defendant’s choice
financially prohibitive.  This exacerbates the problem because the
client may resent a lawyer provided by the United States
government.
Such a lack of individualized consideration of the necessity for the S.A.M.’s also crosses
case lines; one source of opposition to relaxing the S.A.M.’s with respect to Mr. El-Hage
and his co-defendants was the Bureau of Prisons’ continued wariness resulting from an
alleged escape attempt by another alleged Islamic terrorist (occurring some time ear-
lier) in a completely different case.
12. While some of the remediation we were able to achieve may appear mundane,
it did make a difference to Mr. El-Hage and his physical and mental state.  For example,
we were able to obtain much-needed dental treatment for him, double-bunking with a
co-defendant instead of solitary confinement, group prayer sessions with his co-defen-
dants, and a plastic chair upon which he could sit and read discovery and other litiga-
tion documents and write notes (as opposed to the exceedingly uncomfortable
concrete slab in his cell that precluded extended reading and/or writing sessions).
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Thus, counsel’s commitment to the client and ability to accom-
plish the client’s objectives can be demonstrated by concerted chal-
lenges to the S.A.M.’s.  These challenges enable counsel to establish
that he or she is reliable, is competent, listens to the defendant, and
cares about the defendant’s well-being.  This leads to a more coop-
erative relationship between attorney and client, a better-informed
defense lawyer, and a better-prepared and coordinated defense at
trial.
Proper case management by the court in terrorism cases is es-
sential.  When defendants are held under harsh conditions, they
often will take their frustrations out on their attorney.  Any disputes
or dissatisfaction between lawyer and client should be addressed ex
parte and in camera because public airing of tensions can lead to
statements from which there can be no functional retreat.
For example, in United States v. Moussaoui, discussions con-
ducted in open court resulted in the defendant’s election to pro-
ceed pro se.  Although this is his right, the decision has not
improved his chances for acquittal or for avoiding the death pen-
alty if convicted.  In contrast, disagreements between counsel and
defendants in the Embassy Bombings case were handled in camera,
without any government presence or participation.  As a result, al-
most all disputes were resolved short of substitution of counsel,13
thus ensuring stability in the defense team.
Highlighting how the S.A.M.’s contribute to a defendant’s de-
generation can garner sympathy from the court and the media.  A
court’s appreciation of these handicaps can lead to leeway in favor
of the defense.  The handicaps can also illustrate to the press the
unfairness of the defendant’s confinement and the damage those
conditions pose to the preparation of the defense.  Public reporting
from that perspective can pressure the government and the court
to modify the S.A.M.’s to the client’s benefit.
13. There was some shuffling of counsel in the early stages of the case due to some
client-attorney conflicts.  Generally, the attorneys served as a lightning for client tension
and dissatisfaction, since they were the defendants’ only source of contact for the two
years between the inception of the case and the trial.  While certain conflicts proved
intractable, many others were minimized by the court’s handling of the complaints ex
parte and in camera.  By maintaining confidentiality, the court allowed the defendants to
vent their frustrations while preserving the attorney-client relationship in the long run.
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The S.A.M.’s may also provide appellate issues.14  If the
S.A.M.’s render the defendant functionally unable to assist in his
own defense, counsel can argue they deprived the defendant of due
process and a fair trial.15
III. PROTECTIVE ORDERS APPLIED TO DISCOVERY
Protective Orders limit the dissemination of discovery material.
They are de rigeur in terrorism prosecutions and prevent counsel
from sharing discovery information covered by the Protective Or-
der with anyone not pre-cleared by the government.  In the Em-
bassy Bombings case, the Protective Order categorized certain
discovery as “Particularly Sensitive.”  This effectively “sealed” the
material without further order of the court or agreement between
the parties.  This material could not be shared with persons outside
the “cleared” defense team without government authorization and
had to be redacted from publicly filed court submissions and exhib-
its.16  Such material is treated similarly to that covered by protective
orders in military cases.  In the Embassy Bombing case, however,
under the specter of “national security,” most of the discovery mate-
rial was labeled “Particularly Sensitive.”
Since the government had the power to designate discovery it
produced, the “Particularly Sensitive” characterization was applied
rather indiscriminately, reducing material that could be publicly
disseminated to a small fraction of the voluminous discovery pro-
duced during the case.  The Protective Order also required that all
submissions to the court be presumptively sealed for five business
14. The S.A.M.’s have more recently become a bargaining chip in plea negotia-
tions, and provide the government significant leverage in those discussions.  Thus, as an
incentive to plead guilty, the government has recently begun to offer defendants in
terrorism cases the “carrot” of imprisonment after conviction without imposition of the
S.A.M.’s.  Considering the length of imprisonment defendants in terrorism cases face,
the prospect of a long term of imprisonment under the S.A.M.’s is a strong motivator
for choosing any alternative, including pleading guilty.
15. In its recent opinion in Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003), the Su-
preme Court recognized the constitutional importance of a defendant being functional
in preparation for and at trial.
16. “Clearance” in the non-classified context involved submitting the name, date
of birth, and social security number of the person to a government representative who
ostensibly would not share the information about defense personnel with the prosecu-
tors working on the case.
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days pending objection to public filing by any other party.  As a
result of such objections by the government, we often produced re-
dacted versions of documents that could be publicly filed.
These inconvenient procedures constrain and impede the de-
fense’s ability to act quickly and spontaneously.  As a result, the
preparation of the defense is uncoordinated and disorganized at
times.  Indeed, many of the same problems that the S.A.M.’s pre-
sent, such as the inability to share information and pursue investiga-
tive leads due to a lack of communication, are replicated with
“Particularly Sensitive” discovery material.17
The veil of secrecy in terrorism cases can actually help a defen-
dant. Counsel may be able to keep defense information confiden-
tial and use the ex parte process to prepare the defense case.  This
allows the defense to operate in a confidential environment and
educates the judge.  As a consequence, the judge will be aware of
the relevance and materiality of the defense’s cross-examination,
documents, and affirmative testimony when it is offered at trial.
As with the S.A.M.’s, alerting the court to the difficulties faced
by counsel in preparing a case under a restrictive Protective Order
may aid counsel in combating the government’s evidence.  When
judges are fully aware of the difficulties, they tend to allow defense
counsel to conduct more probing cross-examination and are more
lenient in deciding whether defense evidence is admissible.  Courts
also are more willing to authorize expenses for experts, investiga-
tors, and other essential resources in terrorism cases where defense
counsel is court-appointed under the Criminal Justice Act (CJA)18
and appeals to the judges to level the playing field.
In the Embassy Bombings case, we regularly made ex parte ap-
plications seeking authorization to hire experts and investigators or
issue Rule 17(c)19 subpoenas.  Once a court authorizes a CJA ex-
pense, it is more likely to justify the expense by declaring the ex-
17. While “Particularly Sensitive” discovery could be shared with the defendants
(although after the November 1, 2000, assault on the corrections officer, certain materi-
als that described violent conduct were removed from the defendants’ cells and could
not be shown to them), the inability to discuss the materials with all but a small group
of lawyers and experts who were members of the defense team created the same situa-
tion with respect to using the outside world as a resource for the defense.
18. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3006A (2004).
19. Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(c) (2004).
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pert’s testimony or other evidence admissible.  A judge who has
been involved in the process from the outset is more easily per-
suaded that the evidence or expert is essential to the defense and to
a fair trial.
The aura of secrecy surrounding the case enabled us to investi-
gate the case as if it were the converse of a grand jury proceeding.
We used the CJA process as our investigatory arm to counteract the
Protective Order’s constraints on defense investigation and prepa-
ration.  The court also permitted us to call as an expert a witness
who was one step removed from the events about which he testified.
This witness’s testimony concerned the United States July 12, 1993,
helicopter TOW missile attack on civilians in Somalia.  The event
served as an important precursor to the events of October 3-4, 1993,
chronicled in Black Hawk Down and were charged as an Overt Act
in the indictment.20  The judge accommodated us because he was
aware of our difficulties in obtaining a first-hand witness because of
the Protective Order and problems caused by CIPA, discussed be-
low.  He concluded that a fair trial required an opportunity to call
the best available substitute witness.21
The secrecy permeating the case insured that the court would
not make us share information with the government because there
was so much information the judge knew the government had not
shared with us.  The government never learned of the theories we
advanced with the court or the avenues we pursued with the CJA
resources.  The court also steadfastly refused to reveal why we could
not get a first-hand witness with respect to the attack in Somalia
noted above.22
20. MARK BOWDEN, BLACK HAWK DOWN: A STORY OF MODERN WAR (1999).  The
government’s theory was that (based on hearsay statements reported by cooperating al
Qaeda witnesses) al Qaeda had trained persons, or the persons who trained the per-
sons, who engaged the United States forces in Mogadishu, Somalia, on October 3-4,
1993, and downed two Black Hawk helicopters and killed eighteen United States ser-
vicemen.  The defense theory was that the Somali resistance to the United States and
United Nations forces in 1993 was entirely independent of al Qaeda or any fundamen-
talist Muslim forces, and that the indigenous combatants in Somalia, who had been
engaged in civil war for several years prior, were sufficiently capable, supplied, and ex-
perienced to have carried out the October 3-4, 1993 attacks on their own.
21. As a result of our efforts, and the projected testimony by the witness, the gov-
ernment withdrew the Overt Act.
22. The government still does not know why.
18178_nlr_48-1-2 Sheet No. 43 Side A      04/27/2004   12:08:32
18178_nlr_48-1-2 Sheet No. 43 Side A      04/27/2004   12:08:32
C M
Y K
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\48-1-2\NLR208.txt unknown Seq: 11 26-APR-04 14:35
2003] TURNING THE TABLES 79
The Protective Orders’ constraints are also useful in obtaining
appropriate time to prepare.  For example, the identity of the gov-
ernment’s principal witness was not known to counsel until four
days before he testified.  We were not permitted to inform our cli-
ents or anyone else of his identity until the day before he testified.
As a result, we were afforded significant time by the court to review
the voluminous discovery material provided for that witness, pre-
pare for cross-examination, and even to conduct an investigation in
another country.23
The inaccessibility of Somalia and Sudan made it extremely dif-
ficult to gather information about potential witnesses, regardless of
how much time the court gave us.  To counteract these handicaps,
defense counsel should seek to use Letters Rogatory24 and to con-
duct foreign depositions under Rule 15 early in the case.25  Counsel
should also familiarize themselves with the statutes and regulations
authorizing the procurement of documents from foreign govern-
ments and entities.26  Since the procedures for arranging service
and conducting depositions are technical and time-consuming, it is
important to focus on them as soon as possible.  Courts have denied
requests for Rule 15 depositions on timeliness grounds.27
Although Protective Orders may be detrimental, defense coun-
sel should not view them as one-sided, but rather as an invitation to
23. Interestingly, we were given more time to prepare than defense counsel some-
times get in ordinary cases.  Counsel often does not know the identity of a witness until
just before the witness testifies, and counsel often is inundated with a last minute flood
of discovery material that cannot be adequately digested before cross-examination
commences.
24. See 18 U.S.C. § 3492 (“Commission to consular officers to authenticate foreign
documents”).
25. See Rule 15(a)(1), Fed.R.Crim.P., recently amended in 2002 to provide in
pertinent part that:
(a)(1) IN GENERAL. A party may move that a prospective witness be de-
posed in order to preserve testimony for trial.  The court may grant the
motion because of exceptional circumstances and in the interest of justice.
If the court orders the deposition to be taken, it may also require the depo-
nent to produce at the deposition any designated material that is not privi-
leged, including any book, paper, document, record, recording, or data.
26. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3491 (“Foreign Documents”); 18 U.S.C. § 3493 (“Deposi-
tion to Authenticate Foreign Documents”); 18 U.S.C. § 3494 (“Certification of Genu-
ineness of Foreign Document”); 18 U.S.C. § 3505 (“Foreign Records of Regularly
Conducted Activity”); 18 U.S.C. § 3508 (“Custody and Return of Foreign Witnesses”).
27. See, e.g., United States v. Chusid, 2000 WL 1449873 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
18178_nlr_48-1-2 Sheet No. 43 Side B      04/27/2004   12:08:32
18178_nlr_48-1-2 Sheet No. 43 Side B      04/27/2004   12:08:32
C M
Y K
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\48-1-2\NLR208.txt unknown Seq: 12 26-APR-04 14:35
80 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
cultivate the environment of secrecy to the defendant’s advantage.
As long as counsel presents factual bases for such requests, a judge
can be moved to afford a defendant privileges not afforded in ordi-
nary cases.
Defense counsel should draw upon the increasing public and
judicial debate over the proportionality and propriety of the gov-
ernment’s response to terrorism cases.  This permits counsel to in-
voke fundamental constitutional protections, such as the
defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights to confront witnesses, to effec-
tive assistance of counsel, and to assist in the preparation of his de-
fense, and Fifth Amendment rights to Due Process, to a fair trial,
and to present a defense.  Defense counsel is only limited by their
imagination and once counsel starts proceeding with the court in
secret, counsel quickly learns why the government likes to proceed
in that fashion.
IV. THE CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PROCEDURES ACT (CIPA)
The problems presented by the Protective Orders multiply ex-
ponentially with classified information.28  Classified information
cannot be revealed to the defendant or the outside world.  Access
to classified information is limited to other cleared persons with a
“need to know”29 and occurs only in the Secure Compartmental-
ized Information Facility (SCIF).30
CIPA’s unique restrictions strain the lawyer-client relationship
because the defendants accused of terrorist offenses cannot obtain
28. Classified information is an extreme rarity in criminal cases, and before Sep-
tember 11, 2001, was rare even in terrorism cases.
29. In the CIPA context, “cleared” is a vastly different context than it is with re-
spect to the “Particularly Sensitive” material covered by the Protective Orders.  While
“clearance” for the latter required only submission of a social security number and a
date of birth to the “firewall” prosecutor, which then entitled the “cleared” person ac-
cess to the “Particularly Sensitive” discovery, “clearance” to receive classified informa-
tion involved a comprehensive security investigation, including a detailed history,
lengthy personal interview and interviews of neighbors and professional colleagues. See,
e.g., United States v. bin Laden, 58 F.Supp. 2d 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).  Only after that
process was completed and approval granted, could the person “cleared” for CIPA pur-
poses gain access to classified materials.
30. The SCIF is the repository for all classified information given to the defense
and in which all work on classified material – reading, review, motions, letters, stipula-
tions, and any other submissions – must be performed and stored.
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clearance to see classified materials.31  It also strains the relation-
ship between lawyers for different defendants because they can only
receive the classified material related either to all defendants or
their particular client.  CIPA thus makes coordination of strategy
and tactics among defense counsel far more difficult.  Counsel must
continue to communicate while exercising appropriate discretion.
If all of the attorneys are at least generally aware of the kind of
evidence the government will use, surprises can be minimized.
CIPA was enacted in 1980 to prevent “greymailing” by defen-
dants in possession of classified information, usually government of-
ficials charged with espionage or other misconduct.  Greymailing is
a threat by the defendant to disclose classified information by re-
quiring a ruling on the admissibility of the classified information
before trial.32  CIPA provides procedures for notifying the govern-
ment prior to trial of any classified information that will be compro-
mised by the case.33
Historically, however, terrorism cases have not involved
greymail.  In terrorism cases, defendants are not in possession of the
classified information and there is no chance that they will obtain
the necessary clearance to view classified materials.  Thus, the
greymail opportunities are minimized since the defendant cannot
threaten to reveal classified information other than that provided
by the government in discovery.
31. The defendant in United States v. Moussaoui, No. Cr. 01-455-A (E.D. V.A.
2003) has added a new wrinkle to this issue by deciding to appear pro se.  However,
while the government and the Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Moussaoui, 336 F.3d
279, 280 (4th Cir. 2003), appear to anticipate that the defendant, Mr. Moussaoui, would
participate in the depositions and therefore have access to classified information, the
district court’s opinions do not appear to contemplate that level of participation (with
the depositions instead being conducted by standby counsel). See United States v.
Moussaoui, 2002 WL 1987964 at * 1 (E.D.V.A. 2003) (noting that defendant was well
aware that choosing to proceed pro se would not result in  his gaining access to classified
discovery, and that the defendant’s rights were adequately protected by standby coun-
sel’s access to such materials).  The Moussaoui case (and its implications for future CIPA
litigation), discussed in more detail post, is currently on appeal by the government to
the Fourth Circuit.
32. United States v. Pappas, 94 F.3d 795, 799 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting S. Rep. No.
96-823 at 2 (1980), citing United States v. Wilson, 721 F.2d 967, 975 (4th Cir. 1983)).
33. See United States v. Collins, 720 F.2d 1195, 1197 (11th Cir. 1983).
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This dramatic difference renders the CIPA unconstitutional as
CIPA deprives defendants of several Sixth Amendments rights.34
They are deprived of effective assistance of counsel because counsel
cannot discuss classified evidence with a defendant.  This makes it
very difficult to prepare a defendant to testify.  Defendants are also
denied the right to confront the evidence against them.  The right
to confrontation is a personal right and is not exercisable merely
through counsel.35  Defendants also are deprived of the rights to be
present at the CIPA hearings to determine the admissibility of evi-
dence, a critical stage of the proceedings, and to assist in the prepa-
ration and presentation of the defense.
In United States v. Moussaoui, the district court ruled that the
defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to due process – particularly in
the context of a capital prosecution – and his Sixth Amendment
right to compulsory process outweighed the government’s national
security interest with respect to access to government detainees who
possessed relevant and material exculpatory information.36  The
district court also ruled that CIPA did not reduce the government’s
obligation under Brady v. Maryland to give to the defendant excul-
patory information that could have an impact not only on the liabil-
ity phase of the trial, but also upon sentencing (again, particularly
in a capital prosecution).37
CIPA also violates Fifth Amendment rights including the de-
fendant’s right to: (1) testify in his own behalf;38 (2) present a de-
fense, since classified evidence can be excluded and/or diminished
pursuant to CIPA; and (3) remain silent, since in order to intro-
duce classified evidence at trial, even through his own testimony, the
34. 18 U.S.C.S. Appx. § 3 (2004).
35. See, e.g., Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975).
36. 2003 WL 21263699 (E.D.V.A. 2003). See also Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 482;
United States v. Moussaoui, 2003 WL 22258213 (E.D.V.A. 2003).
37. Moussaoui, 2003 WL 21263699 at 4 (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963)).
38. Even defendants who have knowledge of classified information are denied this
right because they are not free to testify about such matters without first previewing
such testimony for the Court and the government, and having it subject to the CIPA
process, which includes potential substitutes for the classified information itself.
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defendant must notify the government in advance of precisely the
evidence the defense seeks to have admitted in evidence.39
The practical problems of reviewing classified discovery with-
out client input are manifest.  Counsel is deprived of the client’s
reaction to the material.  The client is unable to assist in the prepa-
ration of cross-examination of government witnesses and even the
preparation of his own defense strategy and testimony.  Requiring
the attorney to keep secrets can negatively affect the attorney-client
relationship if the client does not understand the lawyer’s obliga-
tion to abide by CIPA’s terms. Not informing the defendant of the
existence or content of classified material requires discipline on
counsel’s part that is antithetical to the conventional full disclosure
requirements.
The negative aspects of CIPA are obvious.40  However, the de-
fense can use it as a sword as much as the government uses it as a
shield.  Inventive thinking can result in significant advantages be-
cause CIPA provides a means to introduce the defense theory in a
concise and coherent manner.  CIPA is a subtle offensive weapon
for the defendant and requires some finesse.  It also requires strict
compliance with the protocols for using classified information.41
39. In the Embassy Bombings case, we made a motion to declare CIPA unconstitu-
tional on these grounds.  The District Court’s opinion denying the motion is reported
at United States v. bin Laden, 2001 WL 66393 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
40. In addition to CIPA, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 50
U.S.C.S. § 1801 involves secret submissions and proceedings.  However, the defense
never sees the underlying applications for search or eavesdropping warrants under FISA
(eliminating FISA as a discovery device akin to an ordinary suppression motion). See
United States v. Nicholson, 955 F.Supp. 588, 592 (E.D. V.A. 1997) (“this Court knows of
no instance in which a court has required an adversary hearing or disclosure in deter-
mining the legality of a FISA surveillance.  To the contrary, every court examining FISA-
obtained evidence has conducted its review in camera and ex parte”), although the inter-
ceptions and seized property are eventually declassified and disclosed.  In the twenty-
five year history of FISA, the statute has invariably survived constitutional attack, and
not a single piece of FISA-generated evidence, by either search and seizure or elec-
tronic surveillance, has ever been suppressed, nor has the government ever had a FISA
warrant application denied. See In re Sealed Care, 310 F.3d 717 (FISCR 2002), reversing
In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F.Supp.
2d 611 (FISC 2002).  Consequently, unless the interceptions or seized materials are
exculpatory, there is very little defense counsel can do to make FISA work for the
defendant.
41. CIPA is administered by a Court Security Officer (CSO) from Washington,
D.C., assigned by the Department of Justice.  The CSO is not part of the prosecution
team, and is often provided copied of classified submissions as a courtesy.  However,
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Nevertheless, defense counsel must be careful not to err too much
on the side of caution.  Rather, counsel must avoid censoring and
limiting themselves unnecessarily and should remain aggressive
within the confines of CIPA’s provisions.
CIPA does provide defense counsel some opportunities.  For
example, counsel may be able to provide the jury with far more
than the inference or argument that the classified evidence would
permit.  Using substitutions for classified information, the defense
can present the very conclusion that counsel would use the underly-
ing evidence to make.  This not only presents the defense theory in
a coherent and direct form but constrains the government to stand
mute in response.  Once counsel realizes that the defense theory
can be introduced without government rebuttal, the opportunities
are limitless.  The first task for counsel is to shift from offering evi-
dence to crafting the defense theory of the case.  The second task is to
envision the defense in an affirmative manner by creating a narra-
tive of the defense in the abstract — in essence, a “wish list” of the
facts counsel wishes to prove and the themes counsel wishes to con-
vey to the jury.  The next step is translating the classified discovery
into relevant, material, and admissible evidence that corresponds to
those facts and themes.  The subsequent negotiations with the gov-
ernment should yield uncontradicted substitutions and stipulations
that provide substance to the defense.42
In the Embassy Bombings trial, there was a government witness
who testified that Mr. El-Hage asked him about transporting
Stinger missiles by airplane from Afghanistan to Sudan on behalf of
Osama bin Laden in 1992.  We had potential cross-examination ma-
terial that the government wanted to remain classified.  In return
for not using that material, we obtained a stipulation that was com-
pletely different than the projected cross-examination material, but
since these submissions are to the court and/or the government, attorney-client or de-
fense team confidentiality are not implicated by providing the CSO with a copy.
42. The Moussaoui defense team’s framing of the issue – that the testimony of
witnesses the government refused to make available because their information was
deemed classified was relevant and admissible because it would establish that Mr. Mous-
saoui was not among the plotters or facilitators of the September 11 attacks – provides
an excellent example of how the defense can fashion the possible impact of classified
information for maximum advantage to the defendant. See United States v. Moussaoui,
2003 WL 212636699, at * 4 - 5; United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480, 486
(E.D.V.A. 2003).
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which made our point explicitly.  We wanted the jury to know that
during the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan during
the 1980’s, the United States had supplied the Afghan resistance,
the mujahedeen, with Stinger missiles.  Thus, the possession of
Stinger missiles by bin Laden was far less suspicious, particularly at
that early stage of al Qaeda’s development.  That stipulation accom-
plished much more than the cross-examination would have.  Even a
perfectly executed cross-examination would not have established
that bin Laden’s possession of Stinger missiles was arguably
legitimate.
Another example of using CIPA restrictions to our benefit in-
volved cross-examination materials.  Potential impeachment mate-
rial was classified, and the government objected to revealing its
existence.  The solution was a prearrangement with the govern-
ment and the court that the witness would be instructed to provide
answers that made the impeachment unnecessary.  Thus, during
that part of the cross-examination, the witness was appropriately
pliant.  Moreover, we were able to fashion a set of questions that
made our point crystal clear.
Although this approach lacks the drama of confronting a wit-
ness with impeaching material, there was no guarantee that the wit-
ness, who was hostile and capable of hiding behind a language
barrier, would have conceded anything.  Cross-examination is un-
predictable.  Government objections could frustrate the inquiry,
and the court might become impatient with counsel’s refusal to ac-
cept the court’s view of an appropriate substitution or stipulation
and limit cross-examination as a result.
In addition, the meaning and significance of cross-examination
is not always readily apparent to a jury.  This problem is considera-
bly reduced by scripting the question and answer dialogue or pro-
viding a narrative stipulation.  Substitutions and stipulations obviate
the need to argue issues of marginal admissibility of classified mate-
rial in the middle of cross-examination.  Since courts recognize the
difficulties CIPA presents counsel with respect to investigation and
access,43 the use of hearsay, summaries, investigative reports, and
43. In our case, for example, we could not call as a witness or obtain first-hand
information from many of the sources of the classified material for a variety of reasons,
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conclusions can be leveraged to gain evidentiary concessions from
the government.
In the Embassy Bombings case, two stipulations were designed
to present defense theories for Mr. El-Hage that we could never
have established through witnesses or documents.  For example,
the history of the Somalia conflict and how it led to the events of
October 3 - 4, 1993, could not have been presented in the testi-
mony of a single witness.  Also, first-hand accounts by participants
were impossible to obtain from a country that had no functioning
government for more than a decade.  Our insistence on access to
classified information regarding the United States’ and United Na-
tions’ military and diplomatic involvement in Somalia and the par-
ticulars of the combat that occurred October 3 - 4, 1993, enabled us
to negotiate a wide-ranging stipulation that incorporated all of the
essential elements of Mr. El-Hage’s defense with respect to al
Qaeda’s alleged involvement in the deaths of U.S. soldiers in
Somalia.  Similarly, we engineered another stipulation that would
have established principles of Mr. El-Hage’s defense – that the spe-
cific planning for the 1998 Embassy bombings did not commence
until well after Mr. El-Hage had returned to the U.S. from Kenya –
that we could never have proven with available or admissible
evidence.
However, those two stipulations did not reach fruition.  The
other defendants believed their interests diverged from Mr. El-
Hage’s with respect to the issues involved and would not agree to
the stipulations.  That difference in opinion reflects the importance
of coordination among defense counsel in multi-defendant terror-
ism cases.  Joint defense agreements are advisable at the pre-trial
stage, as are cooperation with respect to motions, organizing discov-
ery, consulting and preparing experts, digitization, domestic and
overseas investigation, and subpoenas.  During trial, it is imperative
that counsel confer and alert each other to strategic and tactical
decisions that could have an impact on other defendants.  In addi-
tion, jury selection should be a collaborative effort.  In the Embassy
Bombings case, however, the mixture of capital and non-capital de-
fendants made the voir dire process difficult.
including non-disclosure of their identities and/or their location beyond the subpoena
power.
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Lack of cooperation among defense counsel only exacerbates
the secrecy that accompanies CIPA litigation.  CIPA, like the Protec-
tive Orders, severely limits counsel’s ability to interview prospective
witnesses and discover the facts of the case.  As a result, co-defen-
dants’ counsel are an invaluable source of intelligence and assis-
tance.  The same benefits that counsel can derive from the
Protective Orders are applicable to CIPA as well.  In fact, CIPA is
even more useful in expanding the scope of discovery with respect
to nonclassified materials because the court uses that remedy to
compensate for CIPA’s proscription on communication and
investigation.
Counsel can also use their “cleared” status to seek from the
government or the court information that would otherwise be
sealed or submitted ex parte.  Counsel is already privy to classified
information and prohibited from revealing it to the defendant(s).
Counsel can seek disclosure of other nonclassified but still confi-
dential government information subject to the same proviso that it
not be shared with the defendants.  This is especially effective if, as
in the Embassy Bombings case, the defense counsel has a perfect
record of not leaking any sealed information to the public.
Another aspect of CIPA that defendants can exploit is the na-
ture of the classification process.  The adversary at trial is the
United States Attorney’s Office, a division of the Department of Jus-
tice.  That department, however, is not the classifying agency.  Some
other government entity, such as the Central Intelligence Agency or
the Department of State, is responsible for designating information
as classified, and the interests of that agency can have a profound
impact on the prosecutor’s strategy.  At times, the government’s
“intelligence” function supersedes the “prosecutorial” function.44
For example, intelligence agencies are loathe to expose
sources by public disclosure of classified information.  The State
Department is extremely careful to protect foreign governments
that have assisted the United States in investigating and appre-
44. Of course, the converse effect of this ordering of priorities creates certain ca-
veats for defense counsel as well.  While criminal prosecutors may not be comfortable
eavesdropping (either telephonically or electronically) on defense counsel’s conversa-
tions or cyber-correspondence, there is not any reason to believe that the intelligence
apparatus would feel so constrained if it thought for a second that such interceptions
would increase its fund of knowledge of al Qaeda, its members, and/or its targets.
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hending terrorism suspects because aiding the United States can
have negative political repercussions.  Moreover, with respect to al
Qaeda in particular, there is a fear that identifying such nations,
especially in certain parts of the globe, would lead to violent repri-
sals against them.
In the Embassy Bombings case, we peppered the government
with a long list of discovery requests regarding the United States
military’s operations in Somalia in 1992-1993.  Many of these rele-
vant document requests were, as we anticipated, classified.  Since
the Department of Defense is extraordinarily circumspect regard-
ing military operations, particularly with respect to such matters as
equipment used, ordinance expended, rules of engagement, casu-
alty assessments (for Somalis), and “after action” reports, the prose-
cutors elected to bargain for a stipulation that encompassed the
factual foundation of our defense rather than try to persuade the
Department of Defense to release the materials to us.
These considerations are separate from the priorities of a crim-
inal prosecutor and do not exist in ordinary cases.  The prosecutor
is under enormous pressure to resist disclosure and to accommo-
date defendants with generous substitutions and stipulations in or-
der to preserve the secrecy of classified information.  In the
Embassy Bombings case, these bureaucratic imperatives forced the
prosecutor to forego inculpatory evidence that was classified.  This
occurred because the classifying agency objected to revealing it or
because declassification of such evidence would have necessitated
the declassification of other, exculpatory classified material that was
even more sensitive.
CIPA thus can provide defense counsel more leverage in ex-
tracting particularly helpful substitutions and stipulations.  If coun-
sel knows which agency is involved and the stakes involved in
disclosure, he or she can bargain more aggressively with the govern-
ment and the court regarding what substitutions and stipulations
are acceptable.  The goal should be to obtain a substitution or stip-
ulation that offers the defense more both substantively or strategi-
cally than it would have gained from the classified evidence itself.
Counsel can justify aggressively seeking favorable stipulations
and substitutions by arguing that counsel is losing the opportunity
to conduct dramatic and effective impeachment using the primary
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documents, recordings, or prior inconsistent statements.  Counsel
can also argue that the defendant must be given some incentive to
accept the substitute or stipulation to aid counsel in explaining the
matter to the defendant.  A court employing proper case manage-
ment techniques would not attempt to have counsel accept a substi-
tution or stipulation that did not offer some additional advantage
beyond the evidence itself.  In sum, CIPA can be used to support
the defense theory and factual conclusions through substitutions
and stipulations, rather than merely using the statute to obtain reci-
tation of neutral facts.
Sometimes, though, substitutions and stipulations offered by
the government simply do not suffice.  In those situations, if the
court is amenable, the defendant can resist any substitute for the
classified material itself, and force the government into more signif-
icant strategic concessions.
For example, in Moussaoui, the district court agreed with the
defense that “because of its unreliability, incompleteness and inac-
curacy, the Government’s Proposed Substitution will not ‘provide
the defendant with substantially the same ability to make his de-
fense as would’ the court-ordered, videotaped deposition[s].”45
Moreover, in imposing sanctions for the government’s subsequent
failure to allow the defense access to the detainees for pretrial dep-
ositions, the district court rejected both sides’ suggestion that dis-
missal was appropriate, and instead ruled that the government
would not be permitted to seek the death penalty against Mr. Mous-
saoui and/or make any argument or offer any evidence at trial “sug-
gesting that the defendant had any involvement in, or knowledge
of, the September 11 attacks.”46
Thus, by resisting the government’s substitutions and using
CIPA aggressively to its advantage, the defense team in Moussaoui
obtained a significant victory in terms of the scope of penalty and
proof available to the government – an achievement it likely could
not have achieved via any other pretrial motion or strategy.
45. United States v. Moussaoui, 2003 WL 21277161 (E.D.V.A. 2003).
46. 282 F. Supp. 2d at 486-87 (footnote omitted).
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V. CONCLUSION
CIPA anticipates that counsel will be aggressive in pursuing the
admissibility of relevant and material classified evidence.  Although
such efforts are completely appropriate, courts are not encouraged
to accommodate that approach.  As the Senate Report accompany-
ing the statute predicted, the problems CIPA was designed to rectify
were not “limited to instances of unscrupulous or questionable con-
duct by defendants since wholly proper defense attempts to obtain
or disclose classified information may present the government with
the same ‘disclose or dismiss’ dilemma.”47
If the court appears reluctant to afford counsel adequate rein
over classified material, counsel should always be quick to remind
the court that CIPA does not change the laws of discovery.  For ex-
ample, material’s classified status does not make it less discoverable
or admissible.  A court should also be reminded that CIPA is not
supposed to place the defendant in any worse position than he or
she would be absent the classified status of the unavailable
evidence.48
The avenues for reversing the impact of the S.A.M.’s, Protec-
tive Orders and CIPA are not limited to those set forth in this arti-
cle.  Rather, they are as broad as defense counsel’s imagination,
diligence and commitment to the case.  Each of these facets is de-
signed to intimidate, discourage and disable the defense.  However,
they are hurdles that can be surpassed and even used to propel the
defense forward in ways not conceivable in conventional cases.
47. S. Rep. No. 96-823, at 3 (1980); see also United States v. Moussaoui, 336 F.3d
279 (4th Cir. 2003) (denying rehearing en banc) (Luttig, J., dissenting).
48. See United States v. Piondexter, 698 F.Supp. 316, 320 (D.D.C. 1988); see also
United States v. The LaRouche Campaign, 695 F.Supp. 1282 (D. Mass. 1988) (“manifest
objective of CIPA is that classified information should not be disclosed to anyone need-
lessly,” and that “when classified information is not yet in the hands of defendants and
their attorneys and they are making demands for disclosure, the court must consider
whether defendant’s rights can be fully protected by an alternative procedure that does
not result in the disclosure of classified information”).
